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1. Introduction 
The concept of truthmaking, the idea that when a statement or proposition is true, there is typically 
something about the world in virtue of which it is true, has garnered much interest in recent 
metaphysics. Often, the motivation has been the thought that truthmaking can provide a new 
perspective on an important issue. Thus it has been claimed that truthmaking can be used to advance 
debates over realism, ontological commitment, fundamentality, physicalism, and levels of reality; to 
catch “ontological cheaters”; and to distinguish metaphysical issues from linguistic ones.1  
My focus in what follows will be on the claim that truthmaking can play a substantive role in 
defining an unproblematic notion of emergence. While “emergence” and related locutions have been 
used to express a variety of nonequivalent ideas,2 in perhaps the most philosophically interesting 
sense, to say that some property M is emergent is to say that while instances of M synchronically 
depend on instances of other properties, instances of M are truly novel additions to the world; and 
instances of M are genuine additions to the world, at least in part, in virtue of making a unique and 
distinctive causal contribution. It has often been claimed, moreover, that there is no explanation, in 
principle, for why such properties emerge or arise in the way that they do: this is a brute, inexplicable 
                                                          
1 See Armstrong 1989 and 2004, Barnes 2012, Cameron and Barnes 2007, Cameron 2008 and 2010, Heil 2003 and 2012, and 
Sharpe (unpublished ms); for critical discussion, see Merricks 2007, Schaffer 2008, and Schulte 2014. For accounts of 
truthmaking, see Armstrong 2004, Mulligan et. al. 1984, and the papers in Beebee and Dodd 2005 and Lowe and Rami 2009.  
2 For example, in addition to the notion here of interest, “emergent” has been used in a weak metaphysical sense to denote any 
property of a whole that is not easily attributed to its constituents. In this sense, perhaps liquidity is emergent, since the 
characteristics associated with being liquid are not easily attributed to the basic constituents of liquids. Likewise, in an epistemic 
sense, “emergent” has been used to denote properties that cannot, due to epistemic and conceptual limitations of human thinkers, 
be predicted from more basic constituents of the world. While these notions of emergence raise a number of issues, they seem to 
be free of the mysteries often thought to beset the more robust sort of emergence here of interest.  
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kind of determination that must be accepted with “natural piety”. Experiential or phenomenal 
properties are perhaps the best candidate for being emergent in this sense.3 Yet despite playing an 
important role in philosophical discourse over the past 100 years, it has often been thought that there 
is something mysterious about this notion of emergence: some have challenged the putative 
“ontological weight” of emergent properties, and whether the dependence of emergent properties is 
consistent with these properties being genuinely novel, over-and-above other properties; others have 
likewise questioned the proposed causal efficacy of emergent properties, and whether the dependence 
of emergent properties is consistent with attributing to them distinctive, nonredundant causal powers; 
others have questioned the intelligibility of properties arising from or being determined by other 
properties as matter of brute, inexplicable fact.4 It has recently been argued, however, that these and 
related worries—essentially, worries about the very coherence and intelligibility of emergence—arise 
from couching emergence in a “levels-based ontology” in which emergent properties are “higher-
level”. Further, it has been claimed that once emergent properties are instead characterized as those 
that, while “ontologically dependent” are yet needed as truthmakers (and in this sense fundamental), 
emergence and emergent properties prove to be unproblematic. Call this notion “emergenceT”. As 
Elizabeth Barnes (2012: 874) puts it, the idea is that once emergence is articulated as emergenceT, 
“many of the standard puzzles and problems for emergence—and in particular, the worry that 
emergence is ‘mysterious’—can be resolved”. 
While I am cautiously optimistic about the philosophical usefulness of truthmaking, I will 
argue that there is reason to doubt that truthmaking can play an important role in formulating an 
unproblematic yet recognizable notion of emergence. On the one hand, I believe that the 
truthmaking-based concept of emergence that Barnes develops in “Emergence and Fundamentality”, 
                                                          
3 Alexander 1920, Broad 1925, Chalmers 1996, and Vision 2011 argue that there are emergent features in roughly this sense. The 
coherence of a notion of emergence along these lines is defended in McLaughlin 1992, O’Connor 1994, Stephan 1997, and 
Wilson 2005. Horgan 1993 and Melnyk 2003 appeal to the coherence of emergence in the context of arguing that physicalism 
cannot be defined in terms of supervenience: emergent properties, they contend, are taken to supervene on physical properties, 
yet have no place in a genuinely physicalist outlook.  
4 See, for example, Howell 2009, Kim 1999, 2010, and 2011, Nagel 1979, Pepper 1926, and Strawson 2006. 
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as well as in coauthored work with Ross Cameron, succeeds in avoiding the “mysteries of 
emergence”, including worries about the alleged brute determination of emergent properties by more 
basic features of the world. On the other hand, however, I believe that this result is secured largely if 
not entirely by the notion of ontological dependence that emergenceT employs, and that the appeal to 
truthmaking, in contrast, is superfluous. Moreover, while the truthmaking-based concept of 
emergence as such may not be mysterious, it appears that standard concerns about emergence and 
emergent properties can be straightforwardly restated for a subset of those properties taken to be 
emergentT. I will argue for these claims in Section 3. In Section 4 I will argue that it is consistent 
with truthmaking being unable to play a substantive role in emergentism that truthmaking can play a 
more significant role in characterizing an attractive middle ground between reductive and 
nonreductive conceptions of physicalism. 
I will begin by sketching the two central notions of the truthmaking-based precisification of 
emergence: the notion of being needed as a truthmaker and the notion of ontological dependence. 
2. Truthmaking and Ontological Dependence in EmergenceT 
While there is an extensive literature on truthmaking,5 the basic idea is that when some statement, 
representation, or proposition (a truthbearer) is true, there is something about the world in virtue of 
which it is true. Regarding the notion of being needed as a truthmaker, Cameron and Barnes (2007: 
28) write that to be needed as a truthmaker is to be amongst “all and only those things which God 
needs to create in order to make the world how it is… the minimal contents of God’s ‘ontological 
shopping basket’”. In contrast, items not needed as truthmakers need not be included in God’s 
“ontological shopping basket”, as they “come for free” once God has created those items that are 
needed as truthmakers. For example, tablehood is not needed as a truthmaker, since the basic 
physical constituents of reality, suitably arranged, suffice to make true ascriptions of the predicate “is 
a table”. Likewise, liquidity is not needed as a truthmaker, given that the basic physical constituents 
                                                          
5 See fn. 1.  
4 
 
of reality, and how they are propertied and related, suffice to make true ascriptions of “is a liquid”. 
That emergent features are needed as truthmakers appears to be intended as an account of “emergent 
novelty”—as a way of expressing the idea that emergent properties are genuine additions to the 
world, over-and-above those properties upon which they depend.6  
While Barnes (2012: 885) glosses the ontological dependence of emergent properties as the 
idea that they are “caused and sustained” by other properties, in the context of emergenceT 
ontological dependence is officially understood as amounting to the impossibility of independent 
existence: to be ontologically dependent is to be incapable of “lonely existence”. A table, for 
example, is ontologically dependent: one cannot just create a table, for in order to create a table, one 
must also create the entities that compose the table. Importantly, for a property to be ontologically 
dependent—“dependentO”—does not require that the distribution of that property is fixed or 
determined by other properties. For example (Barnes 2012: 890): 
Mass tropes are arguably dependent—certain other tropes (shape and size tropes, 
perhaps) must exist, and relate to each other in specific ways, in order for a mass 
trope to exist. 
However,  
Mass is something quite distinct from shape and size, and ostensibly cannot be fixed 
just by shape and size. It is just that it cannot exist independently of them.  
That emergenceT does not require that emergent properties are fixed or determined by other 
properties might seem unwelcome. For example, it would seem to follow from this that a property 
                                                          
6 Several points are worth noting. First, while Cameron and Barnes do not develop emergenceT specifically as a thesis about 
properties, my focus on properties is consistent with much of the literature on emergence. Second, while Cameron and Barnes 
2007 focuses on the idea that emergent properties are needed as truthmakers and in this sense fundamental, Barnes 2012 takes 
fundamentality to be primitive. However, Barnes 2012 nonetheless suggests that whether something is needed as a truthmaker is 
a guide to whether it is fundamental. Moreover, the gloss on truthmaking offered in Cameron and Barnes 2007—that to be 
needed as a truthmaker is to be “among the minimal contents of God’s ‘ontological shopping basket’”— corresponds to the gloss 
on fundamentality—“the fundamental entities are all and only those entities which God needs to create in order to make the 
world how it is”— given in Barnes 2012. Finally, it should be conceded that the notion of being needed as a truthmaker is not 
entirely perspicuous. However, while I will have something to say about this (see Section 3), this is not a concern that I will 
pursue in detail.  
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may count as emergentT without emerging or arising from anything. It would also seem to follow that 
no particular thesis of supervenience is entailed by the claim that a property M is emergentT.
7 
Likewise, it appears that nontraditional candidates for being emergent, such as mass, are candidates 
for being emergentT. Yet while I will have more to say about the role of dependenceO in the 
truthmaking-based concept of emergence, I do not think that emergenceT should be dismissed simply 
because it has these results. For one thing, while to say that a property M is emergentT does not entail 
that instances of M are fixed or determined by other properties, this is prima facie consistent with 
M’s being emergentT. And because of this, it is prima facie consistent with M’s being emergentT that 
instances of M emerge from other properties, even if this is not entailed by M’s being emergentT. 
Likewise, while perhaps nontraditional candidates for being emergent are candidates for being 
emergentT, emergenceT does not appear to exclude any traditional candidates, precisely because it 
adopts a more permissive conception of “emergent dependence”. In particular, emergenceT defines 
emergent dependence in terms of dependenceO, which is weaker than traditional notions of emergent 
dependence to the extent that it does not involve a fixing or determination requirement. Related 
remarks apply to the observation that nothing in emergenceT requires that emergent properties arise 
from or indeed emerge from other properties, as the example of mass also makes clear.8   
3. Truthmaking, Dependence, and the Mysteries of Emergence  
Cameron and Barnes are aware that emergence has often been viewed with suspicion, and they 
appear to hold that the central advantage of emergenceT is that it clearly and unambiguously avoids 
the alleged mysteries of emergence. I will now consider these mysteries in more detail and how the 
                                                          
7 Cameron and Barnes (2007: 28) appear to regard this as a benefit: emergenceT, they write, permits one to remain “blissfully 
neutral” on whether emergent properties supervene on other properties. In contrast, Howell 2009, Kim 1999 and 2011, 
McLaughlin 1992, and van Cleve 1990 take supervenience to be a constitutive aspect of emergence, and seem to suppose that this 
is how emergence was understood in the classic discussions in Alexander 1920, Broad 1925, and elsewhere. See Section 3 for 
related discussion.  
8 Pearson forthcoming, in contrast, rejects emergenceT as an account of emergence, in part, on the grounds that it countenancing 
nonstandard cases and fails to capture the idea of emergent properties arising or emerging from more basic constituents (and in 
this sense fails to capture the idea of emergence as an asymmetric relation of dependence). While I am uncertain about some of 
the details of Pearson’s arguments, his critique of emergenceT is consonant with the issues that I raise below. 
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truthmaking-based concept addresses them. My claim will be that in each case, truthmaking plays a 
negligible role and that there is an important sense in which the appeal to emergenceT masks, rather 
than answers, the standard concerns about emergence and emergent properties. 
3.1 “Ontological Weight” and Brute Determination 
Barnes (2012: 896) characterizes the problem of “ontological weight” as the problem 
… of saying why, exactly, we need to treat emergent entities with ontological 
seriousness. Emergent entities, on the levels picture, are not absolutely 
fundamental—they are not the basic, indivisible building blocks of matter—or at 
least they are very different from the other sorts of things that are absolutely 
fundamental. But they are not just another variety of complex entity…  
The idea seems to be something like this. Suppose that emergent properties are taken to be 
“higher-level”, and not among the “basic, indivisible building blocks of matter”. In this case, the 
challenge is to say why emergent properties should be treated with “ontological seriousness” and 
regarded as genuinely novel additions to the world in a way that liquidity, for example, is not. While 
Cameron and Barnes say little about the details involved here, it is worth noting that there are several 
facets to the challenge. For one thing, one may wonder just how emergent novelty should be 
understood. While this has often been cashed out in terms of causal distinctiveness—an idea I will 
address separately in Section 3.2—the proposals sometimes offered here are hardly paradigms of 
clarity and rigor. For example, one may worry that claiming that emergent properties are novel in 
virtue of being “simple” or “nonstructural” or “nonfunctional” or “qualitative” or “nonnatural” is 
either obscure, or else fails to specify why such properties ought to be regarded as truly novel 
additions to the world.9 Second, and perhaps more significantly, one might question whether the idea 
                                                          
9 It would take me too far afield to go into detail about all of these proposals. The “nonnatural” character of emergent properties 
is associated with G.E. Moore’s remarks on goodness. However, it is not clear what Moore meant in calling goodness 
“nonnatural”, or why, given what he meant, a commitment to “nonnatural properties” should be thought to have significant 
metaphysical consequences (Dreier 2006; see also Polger 2013). O’Connor 1994 takes emergent properties to be “nonstructural”. 
In pursuing a kind of dualism about experience, Chalmers 1996 emphasizes that phenomenal properties seem to be neither 
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that emergent properties are over-and-above other properties in a way that liquidity is not can really 
be coherently combined with the idea that emergent properties somehow depend on more basic 
aspects of the world. Robert Howell (2009), for example, forcefully argues that given plausible 
theses about property individuation, it cannot be maintained that emergent properties are both 
genuinely novel, over-and-above the physical properties that are instantiated, and that they depend on 
and are strictly determined by the distribution of physical properties. In this way, he claims that 
genuine emergent novelty is inconsistent with the metaphysical supervenience of emergent properties 
on physical properties.10  
It is plausible, as Barnes claims (2012: 897), that concerns along these lines cannot be 
straightforwardly pressed against emergenceT. For one thing, as she (ibid.) emphasizes, there is no 
deep question of why emergentT properties should be granted “ontological weight”. After all, they 
are needed as truthmakers and in this sense fundamental. Likewise, while Cameron and Barnes do 
not focus on concerns about alternative conceptions of emergent novelty, it should be granted that the 
notion of being needed as a truthmaker provides a reasonably clear articulation of emergent 
novelty.11 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it should be granted that there is no incompatibility 
between being needed as a truthmaker and being dependentO. For given that dependentO properties 
need not be fixed or determined by other properties, it is hard to see why being dependentO should 
preclude being needed as a truthmaker, and thus why being dependentO should be inconsistent with 
emergent novelty so understood. Consider the example of mass. To say that mass is dependentO is to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“functional” nor “structural”; for critical discussion, see Stoljar 2006. The idea that emergent properties are “qualitative” is not 
helpful if one thinks that all properties are in a way qualities (Heil 2003) or that while not all properties are qualities, qualities are 
part of the basic building blocks of reality (Unger 1998).  
10 On this basis, Howell (2009) claims that non-physicalist emergentisms cannot be offered as a counterexample to definitions of 
physicalism in terms of metaphysical supervenience (see fn. 3). For discussion of Howell’s defense of supervenience-based 
definitions of physicalism, see Morris 2014b.  
11 One might, however, question the depth of characterizing emergent novelty in terms of the notion of being needed as a 
truthmaker. Given that some property M is both needed as a truthmaker and dependentO, it is natural to wonder why M is needed 
as a truthmaker. It is also natural to think that this question should have a nontrivial answer. Yet the most straightforward answers 
would seem to either appeal to the alternative conceptions of emergent novelty mentioned in the text, or to the dependence of 
emergentT properties. In the latter case, for example, it might be said that M is needed as a truthmaker precisely because the 
distribution of M is not determined by other properties; likewise, it might be said that while the distribution of M is in some 
manner determined by other properties, this holds in a weak enough way that M is nonetheless needed as a truthmaker for 
ascriptions of M. While there is certainly more that could be said here, I will not pursue concerns along these lines in detail.  
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say, at least, that mass cannot be instantiated apart from all other properties. But it does not follow 
from this that the distribution of mass is fixed or determined by other properties. And if the 
distribution of mass is not so fixed, it is difficult to see why mass should not be needed to make true 
attributions of mass, and thus be needed as a truthmaker despite being dependentO. 
On the other hand, I believe that it would be a mistake to think that the idea that emergent 
properties are needed as truthmakers is doing the work here. First, insofar as the proposals for 
understanding emergent novelty mentioned above—that emergent properties are “simple” or 
“nonstructural” or “nonfunctional” or “qualitative” or “nonnatural”—have clear content, it would 
seem that emergent novelty in these senses is likewise consistent with dependenceO. For example, it 
appears that one can consistently maintain that a property is both “nonnatural” or “simple” or 
“nonfunctional”, and yet cannot be instantiated apart from all other properties, and is thus 
dependentO. Second, while being needed as a truthmaker is consistent with being dependentO, being 
needed as a truthmaker fits uneasily with a stronger notion of dependence that involves a fixing or 
determination component. Such a notion may be understood, at least roughly, in terms of 
supervenience, and may be referred to as “dependenceS”.
12 It is difficult to see, for example, why a 
property should be needed as a truthmaker if its instances follow as a matter of strict necessity from 
more basic constituents of the world—essentially, if that property metaphysically supervenes on 
other properties.13 If the experiential states of organisms, for example, follow as a matter of strict 
necessity from physical states of the world, it would seem that physical states of the world will 
suffice to make true attributions of experiential properties.14 Of course, if some weaker, perhaps 
                                                          
12 Supervenience, and the idea that supervenient properties are determined by other properties, expresses a notion of “levels” 
(Kim 2002; see also Heil 2003). However, this is not the same notion of levels that Cameron and Barnes explicitly critique, 
which is a broadly mereological conception. These notions of levels are distinct because levels ordered in terms of supervenience 
or determination relations may not be ordered mereologically.  
13 It has sometimes been held that emergent properties nomologically supervene on other properties and that the nomological, 
rather than metaphysical, supervenience of emergent properties distinguishes emergentism from more physicalistic views 
(Chalmers 1996, McLaughlin 1992, van Cleve 1990). However, the metaphysical supervenience of emergent properties has been 
taken seriously by a number of writers (Horgan 1993, Melnyk 2003, Wilson 2005; see Howell 2009 for discussion).  
14 It might be claimed that a property can both be needed as a truthmaker and yet metaphysically supervene on other properties. 
While perhaps there are accounts of truthmaking that have this result, the gloss on being needed as a truthmaker that Cameron 
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merely nomological, notion of determination is employed, perhaps a property so determined may yet 
be needed as a truthmaker. But the same could be said of the notions of emergent novelty mentioned 
above. For example, one may respond to concerns about the coherence of maintaining that a property 
is both “nonnatural” and yet strictly determined by physical or natural properties by weakening the 
sense of determination at issue, retreating, perhaps, to a thesis of nomological rather than strict or 
metaphysical determination.15 
While I will return to some of these issues below, the present discussion can be summarized 
as follows. EmergenceT has two components, an account of emergent novelty (being needed as a 
truthmaker) and an account of emergent dependence (being dependentO). These components appear 
to be consistent, and emergenceT seems to avoid mysteries surrounding the “ontological weight” of 
emergent properties. However, the idea that emergentT properties are needed as truthmakers appears 
to be superfluous. First, all standard accounts of emergent novelty are consistent with the ontological 
dependence of emergent properties. Second, the truthmaking-based conception of emergent novelty 
fits at least as uneasily as alternative conceptions of emergent novelty with conceptions of emergent 
dependence that do have a determination or fixing component.  
If these remarks are on track, it is misleading to say that emergenceT permits one to remain 
“blissfully neutral” on whether emergent properties supervene on other properties (Cameron and 
Barnes 2007, 28).16 It is true that a thesis of emergenceT does not entail any particular thesis of 
supervenience: emergenceT is defined in terms of dependenceO, and a property can be dependentO 
without its instances being determined by other properties. But if emergent novelty is understood as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Barnes 2007 provide—that to be needed as a truthmaker is to be amongst “all and only those things which God needs to 
create in order to make the world how it is… the minimal contents of God’s ‘ontological shopping basket’”—provides no reason 
for thinking that this is the case, since properties that metaphysically supervene on other properties will not, it would seem, be 
among the “minimal contents of God’s ‘ontological shopping basket’”. Further, I am inclined to think that the kind of strategies 
for combining being needed as a truthmaker with metaphysical supervenience—for example, strategies that emphasize the 
putative explanatory character of truthmaking and the putative non-explanatory character of supervenience—will be available on 
alternative ways of understanding emergent novelty as well.  
15 See fn. 13. 
16 See fn. 7. 
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being needed as a truthmaker, one should probably deny that emergent properties metaphysically 
supervene on other properties. This, again, is a familiar situation for the emergentist: given tension 
between emergent novelty and the idea that emergent properties are determined by other properties, 
the emergentist may aim to weaken the way in which emergent properties are taken to be determined 
by other properties. Similarly, the emergentist may claim that emergent properties have “ontological 
weight” unlike liquidity on the grounds that emergent properties are determined by other properties 
in a weaker sense than liquidity. In this way, when emergent properties are understood in 
truthmaking-theoretic terms, the options concerning supervenience are much like those traditionally 
thought available to the emergentist. 
If the present diagnosis is accepted, it would also seem that there is an important sense in 
which emergenceT masks, rather than answers, concerns about why emergent properties should be 
treated with “ontological seriousness” and whether such a treatment is consistent with emergent 
dependence. Such worries do not apply to emergentT properties as such. But it should still be asked: 
what about the emergentT properties that are not merely dependentO, but moreover dependentS? Is the 
dependenceS of these features consistent with the claim that they carry “ontological weight”? These 
questions are not answered, or even addressed, by the appeal to emergenceT. Importantly, it ought to 
be conceded that these are legitimate questions. While I claimed in Section 2 that emergenceT should 
not be rejected on the grounds that it does not require that emergent properties are determined by 
other properties, this surely ought to be consistent with emergenceT. Suppose it is stipulated that 
emergenceT excludes properties that are not merely dependentO, but moreover dependentS. In this 
case, it would be implausible to maintain that emergenceT is a precisification of emergence in the 
sense of interest. After all, many traditional candidates for emergence, including experiential 
properties, have been taken to be determined by other properties. Further, independently of 
emergentism, such properties do not seem to depend on other properties merely in the way in which 
mass, perhaps, depends for its instantiation on shape and size. In general, it would be a poor defense 
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of emergence to simply restrict emergence to properties that are dependent merely in the way that 
mass, perhaps, is dependent with respect to shape and size. 
Consider, likewise, the important issue of brute determination. This, again, is the idea that 
there is no explanation, in principle, for why emergent features arise from, or are determined by, 
certain properties and conditions. Some philosophers have found this to be a kind of magic that ought 
to be avoided if at all possible; Galen Strawson, for example, appears to regard such brute 
determination as strictly incoherent, and uses this observation to move from the denial reductionism 
about experience to a kind of panpsychism.17 It is true, of course, that in saying that some property M 
is emergentT, one cannot be faulted for thereby supposing that instances of M arise as a matter of 
inexplicable fact from other properties, and so for endorsing an obscure bruteness in the very 
structure of reality. That one cannot be so faulted, however, is not because emergentT features are 
taken to bear an intelligible relationship to the properties from which they arise. Rather, it is because 
emergenceT is defined using dependenceO and dependentO properties need not arise from or be 
determined by other properties. That emergentT properties are needed as truthmakers is beside the 
point, and if the notion of emergenceT cannot be faulted for entailing a mysterious kind of brute 
determination, this is simply in virtue of not entailing any substantive determination thesis.  
As with concerns about the “ontological weight” of emergent properties, while concerns 
about brute determination do not apply to emergentT properties as such, they can be straightforwardly 
developed for a subset of properties taken to be emergentT, those that are dependentS and not merely 
dependentO. Now, on the one hand, one may simply concede that there is no explanation, in 
principle, for why these properties are determined in the way that they are and that truthmaking 
offers no distinctive options when it comes to saying why such brute determination is or is not 
objectionable. On the other hand, however, if one aims to deny that emergentT properties that are 
                                                          
17 Strawson 2006; see also Nagel 1979. Horgan 1993 and Melnyk 2003 claim that brute determination or supervenience is 
coherent, yet is incompatible with physicalism; but see Howell 2009 and Polger 2013 for discussion.  
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dependentS are determined by other properties as a matter of brute and inexplicable fact, the appeal to 
truthmaking may prove to only make this task more daunting. In particular, the determination of 
emergent properties will have to be made intelligible in a way that is consistent with emergent 
properties being needed as truthmakers. While perhaps there is a way to do this, there is prima facie 
reason for doubt. Standard strategies for making intelligible why a property is determined by other 
properties appear to have the consequence that the property so determined is plainly not needed as a 
truthmaker. Consider, for example, causal-functionalist views of physical realization, according to 
which physical realization is taken to involve a physical property playing the causal-functional role 
individuative of the realized property. It is plausible that properties that are physically realized in this 
sense thereby bear an intelligible relationship to physical reality and that a thesis of physical 
realization can explain why certain properties are determined by other properties.18 But it is 
implausible to hold that properties that are physically realized in this sense are needed as 
truthmakers. While physical realization so understood may preclude emergent novelty in all of the 
senses mentioned above, the issue is especially poignant on the truthmaking-based approach, since it 
is especially doubtful that properties that are physically realized are needed as truthmakers.  
First, then, the appeal to emergenceT masks, rather than answers, concerns about brute 
determination: it defines emergence in terms of dependenceO, which does not have a determination 
component; at the same time, however, the extension of emergenceT ought to include properties that 
are determined by other properties. Second, emergenceT may make concerns about brute 
determination even more problematic than they would be otherwise. This is because, insofar as one 
aims to make intelligible why an emergentT property is determined by other properties, that 
emergentT properties are needed as truthmakers may prove to limit the strategies available for 
accomplishing this task. 
                                                          
18 See, for example, Kim 1998 and Melnyk 2003. For related discussion, see Morris 2010. 
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In this section, I considered several related mysteries of emergence. In each case, I argued 
that the truthmaking-based notion of emergence avoids the mystery by weakening the requisite 
dependence of emergent properties. Further, I argued that to the extent that emergenceT ought to be 
consistent with more demanding varieties of dependence, there is a good sense in which emergenceT 
ignores these mysteries. Finally, in no case did the idea that emergentT properties are needed as 
truthmakers appear to be doing any substantive work. Because of this, while I couched my discussion 
in terms of emergenceT, my conclusions can be understood as a critique of not so much of 
emergenceT but rather of truthmaking: if my arguments are successful, they call into question a thesis 
about the usefulness of truthmaking, namely that truthmaking has a substantive role to play in 
articulating an unproblematic yet recognizable concept of emergence.  
3.2. EmergenceT and Emergent Causation 
Emergentists have wished to claim that emergent properties are causally efficacious and figure as 
causes. Indeed, they have often claimed that the causal powers of emergent properties are unique and 
nonredundant—that to give a complete causal account of the occurrence of certain events, one must 
mention emergent properties. This specifies a further variety of emergent novelty: emergent 
properties are novel, at least in part, in virtue of making a distinctive and nonredundant causal 
contribution to the course of events. Yet it has been thought that the proposed causal efficacy of 
emergent properties is problematic,19 and Cameron and Barnes appear to regard this as a core 
challenge to emergence.20 They (2007: 28) present the challenge as concerning how “within a 
physicalist ontology, a higher-level entity could causally impact the behavior of basic-level entities”. 
Similarly, Barnes (2012: 894-95) writes: 
Emergent entities are not, ex hypothesis, part of the very basic building blocks of 
matter… yet it is often assumed that all causation can be explained solely in terms of 
                                                          
19 See Kim 1999 and 2011.  
20 See Cameron and Barnes 2007: 28 and Barnes 2012: 894-97. 
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those basic building blocks. So if emergent entities have causal powers… then we 
have a problem. 
The idea here is something like as follows. On a levels-based ontology, all causation is 
claimed to boil down to the most fundamental entities or features, the “basic building blocks of 
matter”. This is sometimes expressed as a thesis of “causal completeness” or “self-sufficiency”, 
according to which occurrences in the fundamental domain, if they have a sufficient cause at a time, 
have a sufficient cause from the fundamental domain at that time. A physicalist maintains that the 
physical domain is complete or self-sufficient in something like this way. Given this, however, it is 
not easy to make sense of emergent causation. First, if all causation boils down to the “basic building 
blocks of matter”, and emergent properties are not among these building blocks, it makes it difficult 
to see how emergent properties could have unique or nonredundant causal powers. This will 
especially be the case with respect to occurrences that involve these basic building blocks, given that 
any such occurrence will have a sufficient cause from the basic building blocks if it has a sufficient 
cause at all. The worry here concerns how emergent properties can have distinctive powers, and so 
play a unique and nonredundant causal role. Second, it can furthermore be argued that attributing 
“redundant powers” to emergent properties is unpalatable on the grounds that it would entail a 
bizarre double counting of causes. In particular, it would result in there being occurrences that have 
sufficient causes from the basic building blocks, yet furthermore have instances of emergent 
properties as causes. If one regards this as implausible, the conclusion is that emergent properties are 
at best epiphenomenal: they do not have distinctive and nonredundant powers and they do not have 
redundant powers either. 
Cameron and Barnes (2007: 28) appear to hold that emergenceT answers these concerns by 
denying that what is fundamental corresponds to “the ultimate constituents of matter”: 
…once levels have been rejected the causal claim we have warrant to appears to be 
not ‘all causation is explainable in terms of basic-level entities’, but rather ‘all 
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causation is explainable in terms of truthmakers’. But…the emergent entities count as 
truthmakers. 
Barnes (2012: 895-96) puts the idea as follows: 
Once we have levels in place, the physicalist then claims warrant to explain all 
causation solely in terms of what is absolutely fundamental (the very basic things), 
which will never include emergent entities. But the analogous claim for the 
ontological structure assumed here looks to be this: all causation can be explained 
solely in terms of what is fundamental. In that case, of course, there is no causation 
problem for emergence, since emergent entities are fundamental (just not 
independent).  
That is, on emergenceT, emergent properties may be included in a presumptively causally 
self-sufficient domain of fundamental reality, and hence may have unique powers and figure as 
nonredundant causes. Further, as the example of mass makes clear, there is no presumption that 
emergentT features are nonphysical; hence, attributing distinctive causal powers to emergentT 
properties is consistent with the self-sufficiency of the physical domain.  
My response parallels the discussion in Section 3.1. First, it should be conceded that 
emergentT features are not automatically excluded from any self-sufficient domain of fundamental 
reality. As with the concerns about emergence discussed in Section 3.1, this result is secured by 
denying that emergentT features must be regarded as arising from features in a presumptively self-
sufficient domain. But it should still be asked: among putative emergentT properties, what about 
those that are not merely dependentO, but moreover dependentS? Can these properties have 
nonredundant powers, while also arising from other properties? Can those emergentT properties that 
are dependentS do distinctive causal work? However these questions are answered, it appears 
irrelevant that emergentT properties are needed as a truthmakers. The issue concerns, rather, whether 
a feature that arises from or is determined by properties in a self-sufficient domain can itself have 
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distinctive and nonredundant powers, especially with respect to occurrences in the domain from 
which it arises.  
Suppose, moreover, that these questions are answered negatively. In other words, suppose 
that if some domain D is causally self-sufficient and some property M is not included in D but rather 
arises from properties in D, any event brought about by an instance of M will have a sufficient cause 
from D. Could it nonetheless be maintained that instances of M are genuine causes, even though the 
events that they cause also have distinct and sufficient causes from D? This is a controversial issue, 
and it has often been thought that how it is answered will depend on the strength with which 
instances of M are determined by properties from D. For example, it has been claimed that if 
instances of M follow as a matter of strict necessity from properties in D, it is unproblematic to hold 
that events with sufficient causes from D also have instances of M as causes, but that if the 
connection is weaker, the result is a bizarre kind of “overdetermination”—a kind of pervasive, 
systematic and yet inexplicable correlation of causes.21 While there is much that can be said here, the 
modest point is that the defender of emergenceT appears to face the usual options. For example, it 
seems that if the problem of emergent causation is understood in the manner that Cameron and 
Barnes propose, the emergentist will need to specify a suitably intimate kind of determination for 
those emergentT properties that are dependentS, and will need to say why this resolves concerns about 
an apparent overabundance of causes.22 Further, in addition to the usual issues here, concerns about 
                                                          
21 As Eric Funkhouser (2003: 228) puts it, such “overdetermination” would appear to invoke either a sort of “cosmic” 
coincidence or something like a “divinely arranged prearranged harmony”. The distinction between different strengths of 
determination has figured prominently in responses to Kim’s “exclusion problem” for nonreductive physicalism (see Bennett 
2003, Marcus 2001, and Yablo 1992; for discussion, see Morris 2015 and Sharpe 2015). 
22 The understanding of the problem of emergent causation that Cameron and Barnes appear to endorse takes the self-sufficiency 
of the physical (or otherwise fundamental) domain as an underived premise. However, Kim (1999, 2011) argues that if emergent 
properties supervene on physical properties, it is difficult to see how an instance of an emergent property could be a distinctive 
cause of a physical occurrence. The reason, Kim argues, is that whenever an instance of a supervenient property is taken to be a 
cause of a physical occurrence, its physical base will have at least as much claim to also count as a cause of that occurrence. In 
effect, Kim claims that the self-sufficiency of the physical is derivable from a thesis of supervenience on the physical. This way 
of developing the problem of emergent causation is preferable to one that takes the self-sufficiency of the physical as an 
underived premise, since absent some argument to the contrary the emergentist may simply reject this premise. This, in part, is 
how the issue of emergent causation differs from the so-called “exclusion problem” that Kim pursues against nonreductive 
physicalism: the nonreductive physicalist, qua physicalist, cannot reject the self-sufficiency of the physical; in contrast, the 
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an apparent overabundance of causes will have to be addressed in a way that is consistent with 
emergent properties being needed as truthmakers. While perhaps there is an account capable of 
yielding this result, there is some reason for doubt. Again, standard strategies for addressing the 
present kind of concerns about overdetermination essentially work by “tightening up” the 
relationship between properties in the presumptively self-sufficient domain and those properties that 
are determined by properties in that domain. However, at least some of these strategies are prima 
facie in conflict with the idea that emergentT properties are needed as truthmakers. For example, 
accounts that appeal to a thesis metaphysical supervenience or strict determination, as well as any 
account that entails such a thesis, would seem to be unavailable on the truthmaking-based account of 
emergence. This is because, as I argued in Section 3.1, the claim that a property M metaphysically 
supervenes on other properties fits uneasily with the claim that M is needed as truthmaker. As with 
concerns about brute determination, when it comes to issues about a potential overabundance of 
causes, truthmaking offers no distinctive options and in fact threatens to make the problem more 
difficult to address. 
4. Conclusion: Truthmaking and Levels of Reality 
In Section 3, I considered several mysteries of emergence. In each case, while I conceded that 
emergenceT as such is not mysterious, I argued that the appeal to truthmaking is largely if not entirely 
superfluous. Moreover, given that dependentS properties should be included amongst potentially 
emergentT properties, I argued that emergenceT essentially glosses over, rather than answers, the 
worries of those who have been skeptical about the intelligibility of emergence. Aside from these 
concerns about emergenceT, my discussions help to bring out why emergence is problematic, if it is. 
The difficulty is not simply a matter of articulating a decent notion of emergent novelty, but is rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
emergentist, qua emergentist, has no specific commitment the self-sufficiency of the physical. For discussion of Kim’s use of this 
reasoning to defend supervenience-based accounts of physicalism, see Morris 2014a. 
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a matter of combining any notion of emergent novelty—including a truthmaking-based notion—with 
the suggestion that emergent properties arise from and are determined by other properties.23  
I will conclude by noting that it is consistent with truthmaking being unable to play a 
substantive role in emergentist metaphysics that it can play a more significant role in characterizing 
an attractive middle ground between reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In particular, drawing 
from John Heil and Cameron’s work on truthmaking and realism, it might be claimed that 
truthmaking permits one to accept a purely physical ontology while at the same time accepting what 
is right about nonreductive physicalism, roughly as follows.24 Nonreductive physicalism has often 
been motivated by the observation that there is no straightforward mapping between the predicates of 
ordinary discourse and special science on the one hand and the predicates of physics on the other. 
However, according to a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism, this might be conceded without 
inferring that there are distinctive higher-level properties. Rather, it might be claimed that the 
predicates of ordinary discourse and special science apply to things in virtue of how physical entities 
are propertied and related, and that the claims of ordinary discourse and special science are made true 







                                                          
23 For similar assessments of why emergentism is mysterious, see Howell 2009 and Kim 1999, 2010, and 2011.  
24 See Cameron 2008 and 2010, Heil 2003 and 2012 for ideas along these lines; see also Cameron and Barnes 2007. Neither Heil 
nor Cameron explicitly develop a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism: Cameron 2008 and 2010 focuses on the issue of 
material composition while Heil 2003 and 2012 is primarily concerned with whether realism demands that the predicates of a 
discourse have distinctive properties as semantic values. A truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is suggested in Sharpe 
(unpublished ms.). 





According to the present proposal, truthmaking provides the means to move from (A) to (B)—it 
provides the conceptual resources to dispense with higher-level properties as intermediaries between 
higher-level truths and physical reality in favor of a “one level” physical ontology. 
What I would like to mark is that this use of truthmaking is quite different from the role in 
emergentism critiqued in Section 3. Regarding emergence, the crucial truthmaking-based notion is 
being needed as a truthmaker. But when it comes to properties that are needed as truthmakers, 
truthmaking does nothing to dispense with levels of reality. Rather, the work is done through 
weakening the manner in which such properties are said to be dependent: a notion like emergenceT 
can dispense with levels of reality, if at all, simply because there are notions of dependence, such as 
dependenceO, that do not entail that dependent properties are determined by other properties. In 
contrast, on a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism, the crucial notion is that of not being 
needed as a truthmaker. Here, the role of truthmaking consists not in securing the “ontological 
weight” or novelty of some properties, but rather in specifying a sense in which some properties lack 
such weight or novelty. That is, the role of truthmaking consists in providing a potential route for 
dispensing with superfluous properties, rather than in legitimizing properties that are presumed not to 
be superfluous.  
The role that truthmaking might play in dispensing with properties not needed as 
truthmakers, and so any levels that they occupy, deserves further discussion, and some of the relevant 
ideas here have been subjected to important criticisms.26 For my part, I am not sure that truthmaking 
can ultimately provide an illuminating approach to physicalist metaphysics, and whether truthmaking 
is capable of playing the proposed role in physicalism may depend, in part, on how truthmaking is 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Schaffer 2008 and Schulte 2014. 
Figure 1. P is some physical property or state, M is some putative higher-level 




articulated.27 My modest point here, however, is that whether or not truthmaking can play a role in 
this context is quite independent from the minimal role that, I argued, truthmaking can play in 
emergentist metaphysics.28  
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